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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940725-CA 
v. : 
TERENCE L. PARKER, : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Should this Court reverse its own precedent and ignore plain 
rule language in order to excuse pro se prisoners from timely 
filing their notices of appeal with the district court? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A^P RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By information dated July 14, 1992, the State charged 
defendant with burglary and criminal mischief (R. 7-8). Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted 
burglary (R. 67-77), and the trial court dismissed the criminal 
mischief charge (R. 78). The court also held the plea in 
abeyance for eighteen months pending defendant's successful 
compliance with certain conditions, including that he not 
initiate any contact with the victim (R. 75, 78-79). 
Defendant failed to comply with this condition, and the 
trial court issued an order to show cause why it should not 
accept the guilty plea and sentence defendant (R. 54-55). After 
a hearing, the trial court found defendant had violated the terms 
of the plea-in-abeyance agreement and accepted the guilty plea 
(R. 93-94) . 
The court filed its judgment on October 25, 1994 (R. 126). 
Defendant dated his notice of appeal November 18, 1994, and 
certified that he mailed the certificate to the county attorney 
on November 19, 1994 (R. 150-51). Nevertheless, the district 
court's file stamp shows defendant did not file his notice of 
appeal until November 28, 1994 (R. 150). On that same date, 
defendant filed a motion to extend the time to file the notice of 
appeal (R. 14 8-49); however, the trial court never ruled on that 
motion. 
The State moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. By memorandum decision dated October 19, 1995, 
this Court granted that motion. Defendant timely petitioned for 
rehearing. 
2 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
The historical facts have no relevance to defendant's 
petition for rehearing; therefore, they will not be included in 
this response. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED NO CLEAR ERROR OR CHANGE IN 
CONDITIONS TO JUSTIFY OVERRULING STATE V. PALMER AND 
EXCUSING PRO SE PRISONERS FROM TIMELY FILING THEIR 
NOTICES OF APPEAL WITH THE DISTRICT COURT 
Defendant asks this Court to adopt the "prison-delivery" 
rule, which provides that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal is 
deemed filed when he places it in the prison mail system. In 
State v. Palmer. 777 P.2d 521 (Utah App. 1989), this Court 
considered and rejected an identical request. Id. at 522. In 
reaching that conclusion, this Court correctly relied on the 
plain rule language, which requires filing the notice in the 
district CQUrt within the thirty day period, and on the rules and 
binding Utah Supreme Court case law that precluded it from 
determining whether an untimely criminal appeal may proceed. Id. 
(citing Utah R. App. P. 4(a), Utah R. App. P. 2 (precluding this 
Court from extending the time for filing a notice of appeal), and 
Stat9 v- Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981) (holding that an 
3 
appellant must proceed in the sentencing court under rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where he is deprived of his right 
to appeal)). 
Nevertheless, defendant asks this Court to overrule Palmer 
and interpret the rule to mean that he, as a pro se prisoner, 
filed his notice of appeal when he placed it in the prison mail.1 
Before this Court may overrule Palmer, defendant must establish 
that Palmer xxxis clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so 
as to render [it] inapplicable.'" State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 
393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (citation omited), cert, denied. 115 
S.Ct. 910 (1995). Defendant has established neither. To the 
contrary, the plain rule language and good policy dictate against 
adopting the prison-delivery rule. 
As this Court recognized, no plausible interpretation of the 
rules permits the exception defendant asks this Court to adopt: 
rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires appellants 
defendant's argument implicitly asks this Court to hold 
that the date on the mailing certificate establishes the date on 
which he actually delivered the notice to the prison for mailing: 
defendant offers no other proof of when he actually put the 
notice in the prison mail. This presents an unacceptable 
alternative for determining when a pro se prisoner filed his 
notice of appeal. Adopting this rule would give pro se prisoners 
the power to make their notices timely merely by dating them 
within the thirty day period regardless of when they actually 
placed them in the prison mail system. 
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to file their notices "with the clerk of the trial court." State 
v. Palmer. 777 P.2d at 522 (emphasis added). Defendant offers no 
rational basis for interpreting uclerk" to mean the prison mail 
system when the litigant is a pro se prisoner. See Houston v. 
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 281 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (u [s]urely 
Congress could not have imagined that . . . * filed with the 
clerk' . . . could have a meaning as remote from plain English as 
'delivered to the warden'"). 
Defendant suggests that the Court should overrule Palmer 
because the "overwhelming case law" has adopted the prison-
delivery rule in Houston v. Lack. That argument misstates the 
status of the law: the states appear evenly split and the United 
States Supreme Court adopted the rule in a five to four 
decision.2 An even split of authority in other states, and a 
2As defendant correctly points out, California, Florida, and 
Massachusetts have adopted the prison delivery rule. See, e.g.. 
In re Jordan, 840 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); Haag v. State, 
591 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1992); Commonwealth v. Hartsarove. 553 N.E.2d 
1299 (Mass. 1990). Louisiana, Alabama, Nevada, and Oklahoma have 
also adopted the rule. See, e.g.. Tatum v. Lynn. 637 So.2d 796 
(La. Ct. App. 1994); Holland v. State. 621 So.2d 373 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1993); Kelloacr v. Journal Communications. 835 P.2d 12 (Nev. 
1992); Woody v. State, 833 P.2d 257 (Okl. 1992). Oregon also 
adopted the rule in cases involving appeals from prison 
disciplinary proceedings, but did so on the basis of a rule that, 
unlike the one involved in this case, did not make the place of 
filing the notice part of the jurisdictional requirement. Hickey 
v. Oregon state Penitentiary, 874 p.2d 102 (Or. ct. App. 1994). 
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narrow majority holding of the United States Supreme Court 
interpreting the federal rules does not establish the clear error 
necessary to justify overruling Palmer. 
Defendant's petition suggests that good policy requires 
adopting the rule because, without it, he will lose his right to 
appeal.3 However, defendant has another recourse available to 
him: at the time he filed his untimely notice of appeal, he filed 
By contrast, New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Delaware, and 
Arkansas, as well as Utah, have rejected it. See, e.g.. Espinal 
v. State, 607 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1993); Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 587 A.2d 48 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); O'Rourke v. 
State, 782 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Carr v. State, 554 
A.2d 778 (Del.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989); Kev v. State. 
759 S.W.2d 567 (Ark. 1988); and State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521 
(Utah App. 1989). Earlier Ohio cases recognized the prison-
delivery rule, but a more recent Ohio Supreme Court case rejects 
it. Compare State v. Westfall, 346 N.E.2d 282 (Ohio 1976) with 
State ex rel Tvler v. Alexander, 555 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio 1990). 
3Defendant mistakenly casts this argument as a claim that 
dismissing his appeal discriminates against him based on his 
status as a pro se prisoner and therefore denies him equal 
protection of the law. However, this Court's precedent would 
require dismissing the appeal regardless of whether the appellant 
were incarcerated; the rule requiring timely filing the notice 
with the district court applies to everyone. 
Indeed, defendant seeks not equal, but preferential 
treatment for pro se incarcerated litigants. All non-
incarcerated and incarcerated, but represented appellants would 
have to file their notices with the district court within the 
thirty day period. Defendant asks this Court to rule that only 
incarcerated, pro se appellants timely file their notices if they 
mail it within that period. 
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a timely motion to extend the time for filing his notice, on 
which the trial court never ruled (R. 148-51). Once this case is 
remitted, defendant may ask the trial court to rule on that 
motion. If the trial court accepts defendant's factual 
assertions that he mailed the notice six days before the deadline 
and agrees that those facts establish good cause for filing a 
late notice, it may grant defendant's motion, Utah R. App. P. 
4(e). If defendant files his notice within ten days after the 
trial court enters an order granting the motion, the appeal may 
proceed with the jurisdictional defect cured. Id. See also In 
re M.S.. 781 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah App. 1989)(temporarily 
remanding the appeal for disposition of a motion to extend time). 
Utah law also provides a remedy for those who are denied 
their constitutional right to appeal, but who, unlike defendant, 
have no motion to extend pending. Under Utah law, appellants 
deprived of their right to appeal may seek relief in the district 
court through rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. 
Johnson. 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981); Boaaess v. Morris. 635 P.2d 39 
(Utah 1981) . If they can prove facts that establish a 
deprivation of their right to appeal, the district court may 
enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to provide an opportunity for an 
appeal. Johnson. 635 P.2d at 38; Boaaess. 635 P.2d at 42. 
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Because defendant and other appellants have a means to address 
any denial of their right to appeal, no good policy reason exists 
to adopt the prison-delivery rule as a means of protecting that 
right. 
CONCLUSION 
Because petitioner has established no clear error, and 
because no good policy reason exists for adopting the prison-
delivery rule, the State requests that this Court deny 
defendant's petition for rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z^ day of /f^W , 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
> 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING was mailed by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following on this of 
/ t W . 1995: 
TERENCE L. PARKER 
2495 West Carson Lane 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
^\<\^^-^L^ 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rule 65B UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 218 
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 
1977). 
— S e p a r a t e action. 
Subdivision (c) of this rule does not preclude 
a separate action on an injunction bond; 
rather, it allows an action on the bond to be 
enforced in the action in which it is filed at the 
option of the enjoined party. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Char-
tered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
Wrongfully issued injunction. 
If the restraining or enjoinder is not wrong-
ful, the party enjoined has no basis for recovery 
on the bond; if, however, it is found that the 
injunction was wrongfully issued, the enjoined 
party has an action for costs and damages in-
curred as a result of the wrongfully issued in-
junction. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1984). 
The award of attorney fees to be paid from an 
injunction bond should be limited only to the 
hours spent by defendants' counsel as a result 
of the wrongfully issued injunction. Beard v. 
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Showing by party sought to be enjoined. 
—Operation of nuisance. 
A defendant who wants to operate a plant 
which has been declared to be a nuisance is 
required to offer evidence to the court as to how 
the plant can be used without creating a nui-
sance before he can complain that the court did 
not tell him how he could use his plant. Draper 
v. JJB. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 
P.2d 360 (1952). 
Wrongful injunction. 
—Attorney's fees. 
When attorney's fees are incurred in defend-
ing against wrongfully obtained injunctive re-
lief and also against an underlying lawsuit, it 
is appropriate to determine the amount of the 
total fees attributable to resisting the injunc-
tion. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Under this rule, a party is entitled to recover 
only those attorney fees that would not have 
been incurred but for the application for, and 
issuance of, the preliminary injunction. Fees 
that would have been incurred anyway, in the 
course of proving the party's entitlement to 
judgment and refuting the opposing party's de-
fenses, are not recoverable. Tholen v. Sandy 
City, 849 P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, de-
nied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
—Measure of damages. 
The correct measure of damages is the reduc-
tion or diminution in the value of the property 
during the period of restraint. If the value of 
the property did not diminish during that pe-
riod, any measure of damages other than a 
comparison of the fair market value of the 
property before and after the injunction would 
be incorrect. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Noncompliance with rule. 
A temporary restraining order that failed to 
define the injury and state why it was irrepa-
rable, containing instead mere conclusory 
statements, and that failed to list the reasons 
for extending the order, was improperly 
granted. Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 
858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 
§§ 10,14, 48 to 52, 69 et seq., 265, 296 to 303, 
310 to 316. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 8,16,22 to 
24, 36 et seq.; 43A C J.S. Injunctions §§ 165, 
166, 180, 206, 208. 
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, en-
forceability of covenant not to compete in, 17 
AX.R.3d 863. 
Appealability of contempt adjudication or 
conviction, 33 A.LJt.3d 448. 
Review other than by appeal or writ of error, 
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject 
to, 33 A.L.R.3d 589. 
Propriety of permanently enjoining one 
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from 
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in 
question, 38 A.L.R3d 572. 
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver-
sion of water by municipal corporation or pub-
lic utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426. 
Preliminary mandatory injunction to pre-
vent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting 
practices, 49 A.LJR.3d 1239. 
What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying 
refusal to honor, or injunction against honor-
ing, letter of credit under UCC $ 5-114(1), (2), 
25 A.L.R.4th 239. 
Recovery of damages resulting from wrong-
ful issuance of injunction as limited to amount 
of bond, 30 A.L.R.4th 273. 
Right of employee to injunction preventing . 
employer from exposing employee to tobacco 
smoke in workplace, 37 A.L.R4th 480. 
Propriety of federal court injunction against 
suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 831. 
Key Numbers. — Injunction #• 9 et seq., 
143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprison-
ment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate au-
thority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and 
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. 
uiATi KUUSS UF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65B 
The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for ex-
traordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special proce-
dures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules, 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state 
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the com-
mitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the 
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and com-
mitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement. 
(2) Commencement Except for challenges to parole violation proceed-
ings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in 
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may 
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the 
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings 
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is 
located. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims 
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The peti-
tion shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
OB) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted 
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction 
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceed-
ings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which 
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of 
the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment 
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, 
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and 
the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adju-
dicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to 
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of 
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached, 
the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, 
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in 
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the 
Rule 65B UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 220 
presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who 
issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have al-
ready been abjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is 
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court con-
cludes that all or part of the petition IB not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and 
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed un-
der these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county 
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days 
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memo-
randum to the motion. No farther pleadings or amendments will be per-
mitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion 
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery 
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may 
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing confer-
ence, but the conference shall not be Bet so as to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter 
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged com-
mitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, cus-
tody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any 
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release 
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as al-
lowed under Rule 64(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the 
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may 
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was 
originally charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition 
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those 
courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, 
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has 
ZZ1 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65B 
been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant 
relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner 
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is 
occurring. 
(S) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall 
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place 
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the 
restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of 
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner 
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner 
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that 
abjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in 
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on 
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to 
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of 
the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being 
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a 
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent 
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the 
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a 
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances re-
quire, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to ap-
pear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An 
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has re-
strained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person 
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the 
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be re-
strained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irrepa-
rable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the 
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determina-
tion of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent can-
not be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any 
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having 
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been 
named as respondent in the action. 
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(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or 
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, 
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with 
according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court or-
ders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and 
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person hav-
ing custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall 
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct 
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the 
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall 
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the 
petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, 
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for 
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (d). Any person who 
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is 
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if 
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by an-
other or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by 
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompa-
nied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided 
for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a 
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public 
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation 
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer 
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state 
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or 
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or 
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
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has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior 
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named 
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule 
represents a complete reorganization of the for-
mer role. This rule also revises parts of the 
former rule dealing with habeas corpus and 
post-conviction remedies. The rule applies gen-
erally to proceedings that are necessitated by 
the absence of another plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the court. After the rule's in-
troductory paragraph, each subsequent para-
graph is intended to deal with a separate type 
of proceeding. Thus, subparagraph (b) deals 
with proceedings involving wrongful imprison-
ment; subparagraph (c) deals with proceedings 
involving other types of wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty; paragraph (d) deals with pro-
ceedings involving the wrongful use of public 
or corporate authority; and paragraph (e) deals 
with proceedings involving the wrongful use of 
judicial authority or the failure to exercise 
such authority. To the extent that the special 
procedures set forth in these paragraphs do not 
cover specific procedural issues that arise dur-
ing a proceeding, the normal rules of civil pro-
cedure will apply. 
This rule effectively eliminates the concept 
of the "writ" from extraordinary relief proce-
dure. In the view of the advisory committee, 
the concept was used inconsistently and 
confusingly in the former rule, and there was 
disagreement among judges and lawyers as to 
what it meant in actual practice. The concept 
has been replaced with terms such as "hearing 
order" and "relief that are more descriptive of 
the procedural reality. 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph replaces sub-
paragraph (i) of the former rule. It governs pro-
ceedings based on claims of wrongful imprison-
ment, regardless whether the claim relates to 
an original commitment or a commitment for 
violation of probation or parole, but this para-
graph does not govern proceedings based upon 
claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement. Claims relating to the terms or 
conditions of confinement are governed by sub-
paragraph (c) of the rule. Paragraph (b), as a 
general matter, simplifies the pleading re-
quirements in wrongful imprisonment cases 
and contains three significant changes from 
procedure under the former rule. First, the 
paragraph requires the presiding judge to as-
sign wrongful imprisonment cases "if possible" 
to the judge who issued the commitment order. 
Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss 
frivolous claims before any answer or other re-
sponsive pleading is required. This provision is 
patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. i 2254. Third, the attorney general 
or county attorney must file a responsive 
pleading only after the court has concluded 
that all or part of the petition is not frivolous 
on its face and has directed the clerk to serve a 
copy of the petition. The advisory committee 
adopted the summary procedures set forth in 
paragraph (b) as a means of balancing the re-
quirements of fairness and due process on the 
one hand against the public's interest in the 
efficient abjudication of the enormous volume 
of wrongful imprisonment cases pending in the 
courts. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph governs all 
petitions claiming that a person has been 
wrongfully restrained of personal liberty other 
than those specifically governed by paragraph 
(b). It replaces paragraph (f) of the former rule. 
Like paragraph (b) of the present rule, para-
graph (c) endeavors to simplify the procedure 
in habeas corpus cases and provides for a 
means of summary dismissal of frivolous 
claims. Thus, if it is apparent to the court that 
the claim is "frivolous on its face", the court 
may issue an order dismissing the claim, which 
terminates the proceeding. Apart from this sig-
nificant change from former practice, para-
graph (c) is patterned after the former rule. 
Paragraphs (d) and (e) replace paragraph (b) 
of the former rule. Hie committee's general 
purpose in drafting these paragraphs was to 
simplify and clarify the requirements of the 
preexisting paragraph. 
Paragraph (d). Paragraph (d) replaces para-
graph (b)(1) of the former rule. This paragraph 
deals generally with proceedings for the un-
lawful use of public office or corporate fran-
chises. As a general matter, the attorney gen-
eral may seek relief on grounds enumerated in 
the paragraph. Any other person, including a 
governmental officer or entity not required to 
be represented by the attorney general, may 
also seek relief under paragraph (d) if the per-
son claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully 
held by another or if the attorney general fails 
to file a petition under paragraph (d) after re-
ceiving notice of the person's claim. In allowing 
appropriate governmental entities and officers 
to proceed under this paragraph, the rule elim-
inates a procedural barrier that previously pre-
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•on might appeal as matter of right Jensen v. an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg-
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man-
Order denying a motion for summary judg- ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State 
ment was not a final order and was not appeal- Tax ComnVn v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen- (Utah 1986). 
dant alone is not a final judgment where the An unsigned minute entry does not oonsti-
aetion against the remaining defendant re- tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State 
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
1306 (Utah 1983).
 a t e d m EuBton v< L e w i B j 8 1 8 P>2d 531 
Unsigned minute entry. (Utah 1991); Boggs v. BoggB, 824 P.2d 478 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLR. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
AXJEUth 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
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No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative actions. 
Attorney fees. 
Croee-appeal. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
—Amendment or modification of judgment. 
Filing of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Premature notice. 
Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
Cited. 
Administrative actions. 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for 
review of administrative actions. Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial ComnVn, 860 
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney feea. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Croee-appeaL 
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-ap-
peal, a respondent may not attack the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti 
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4). 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a fail-
ure to act in time ia due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.RC.P., autho-
rizing the court to relieve from final judgment 
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
filed. Holbrook v. Hodaon, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
P.2d 843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing 
an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Recon-
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo-
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, aa opposed to 
a nonjuriadictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law-
yer ia too busy, but is to cover emergency situa-
tions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Montpya, 825 PJ2d 676 (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
—Amendment or modification of judg-
ment 
If an amendment or modification does not 
change the substance or character of a judg-
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal. 
Nielaon v. Gurley, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Doriua, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk waa not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile 
court, and the original waa returned to appel-
lant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Final order or Judgment 
Where the trial court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either ia premature because the judg-
ments are not properly "final." Lareen v. 
Lareen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights aa parental custodian. State, In re 
TJD.C, 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts 
to run on the date when the trial court enters 
its first aigned order denying the motion. 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1990). 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion waa timely 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), UJRCP., to upset the 
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion waa made, but 
before the disposition of the motion, the motion 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the re-
quired time from the date of the entry that 
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 658 
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
The time for appeal of an order confirming 
an arbitrator's award runs from the order 
denying appellant's timely motion to alter or 
amend that judgment under Rule 59, UJLC.P. 
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court may not consider an ap-
peal from the dismissal of a complaint for 
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial 
court has had an opportunity to review the or-
der in question by ruling on all pending post-
judgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 
694 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1984). 
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition 
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
